

Counterfactuals are part of the meaning of causation but are not necessarily part of how we know about it

!400 Causal mapping is easier if we are realist about causation

We can **learn** about causal powers via constructing or observing pseudo-counterfactuals, but also via other routes.

Maybe counterfactual arguments logically follow from facts about causal powers. But the meaning of "X caused Y" can't be reduced to a counterfactual statement about co-occurrences.

The meaning of "X caused Y" maybe implies something about a counterfactual: broadly speaking, that Y would not have happened if X had not happened and everything else had stayed exactly the same. (Philosophers love to argue over the details.)

But the meaning of "X caused Y" can't be *reduced* to a statistical, counterfactual statement about co-occurrences. It says that the co-occurrences are true but they happen *because X has the power to cause Y*, and X happened.